The 18th Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in Doha in 2012 resulted in the Doha Climate Gateway being formulated in several key decisions: (1) The Kyoto Protocol Amendment includes the implications of implementation of various methodologies in the Second Period Commitment (CP2) ; (2) Timeframes for the 2015 global climate change treaty and to accommodate other efforts to reduce emissions by 2020, as well as the continuation of work programs to develop post-2020 regime agreements; (3) Settlement of new infrastructure that supports technology transfer and financial support for developing countries; (4) Long-term funding system to support efforts to reduce the effects of climate change; and (5) Completion of the mandate of the Bali Action Plan, with some decisions related to its implementation including on funding, technology and adaptation.
The first item of the Doha Cilamte Gateway on the Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol is the most important because it addresses the key issues of implementation in the Kyoto Protocol's Second Commitment Period for 8 years, from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2020. This is because The First Period of Kyoto Protocol (CP1), which sets targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries, is only valid until December 31, 2012. Therefore, since 2005 various discussions and negotiations on post-2012 climate change regime have been held.
Nevertheless, in fact, the results of decisions in COP 18 set forth in normative, official sentences, and suggesting that the parties have been engaged in such a strong commitment have not yet been fully applicable to the parties. The nearly seven-year long talks on the commitment of the second period of greenhouse gas emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol are increasingly mired in differences and disagreements between developing and developed countries. Developing countries want the Doha talks to generate ambitions to increase emissions reductions for second-period commitments, while developed countries are instead adamantly maintaining their current weak targets, with uncertainty over the future targets.
In addition, developing countries also insist that the CP2 to be determined by amendment must be legally binding to Annex B of the Protocol, which contains limits on the amount of emissions or the aim of reducing the Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Objectives (QELROs) of each developed country party. Thus, the conclusion of the commitment of the second period of Kyoto Protocol 2013 2020 on the one hand removes the confusion of many parties against the spirit of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). On the other hand, however, we note that this second-period commitment is not strong enough to face the challenges of climate change, for developed countries, let alone developing countries. One of them because it has not been accompanied by QELROs itself. The results of COP 17 held in Durban in 2011, also called the Durban Platform which operates the Cancun Agreement, including the establishment of the Adaptation Committee, Technology Mechanism, and the Green Climate Fund, are just preparing the next global binding climate change agreement to be approved in 2015 and implemented starting in 2020.
In other words, there are four fundamental issues in preparing and enforcing CP2 within the next eight years. First, related ambition targets. As has been explained earlier that developing countries want the Doha negotiations to produce clear ambition targets on increasing emissions reductions for CP2 for Annex 1 countries. Meanwhile, the lack of strong will of Annex 1 countries to increase their ambition level is related with the promise of low emission reductions. Second, related legally binding force. As has already been mentioned previously, developing countries insist on establishing CP2 by amendment to legally bind Annex B of the Protocol, which contains restrictions on the amount of emissions or reduction objectives of QELROs not supported by Annex 1 countries.
Third, regarding the determination of QELROs. The clear provision of the provisions of QELROs in CP2 also further dilutes the expectation of developing countries on commitments of Annex 1 countries. Restrictions on the amount of emissions or reduction objectives of QELROs from each developed country party are not legally binding for Annex 1 countries. , the fourth is related to the format or framework of the CP2 legal instrument. What is the multilateral climate change format / framework after the end of the Kyoto Protocol's second period of commitment adopted by 2015 at the latest? Whether it is by establishing a new protocol or through a format or an other legal instrument, which isOn the one hand, they are required to maintain economic growth, one of which is by increasing the capacity of industry and trade, which in fact will require energy, including petroleum and coal which is certainly not environmentally friendly. However, on the other hand, they must also stick to their commitment to withstand global temperature rise below 2C in accordance with international agreements. Yes, heavy choice. Let's see how in the end the results of climate talks that are currently being held in Warsaw. Do they (Annex I countries) still insist on fighting for their own national interests, or begin to look a little bit at the climatic conditions of the earth that are becoming increasingly uncertain and unpredictable today.
Jakarta, November 16, 2013